[and] is permissible so long as the neutral regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.
The statute will — and is designed to — constrain people from communicating with other people in certain specified ways. — whatever else this is, it would hardly seem plausible to suggest that it is not regulating the ability of previously convicted sex offenders to communicate with others. advertising,” the site “[f]acilitates the social introduction between two or more persons for the purposes of friendship, meeting other persons, or information exchange,” we “[a]llow users to create Web pages or personal profiles that contain information such as the name or nickname of the user,” and — through the Facebook links — we “[p]rovide users [with] mechanisms to communicate with other users.”This statute addresses the ability of registered sex offenders to access some social networking Web sites. Is the court seriously suggesting that that would just be considered a regulation of “conduct” — because, I suppose, it affects only individuals’ movement through space — that “only incidentally burdens the ability [of persons subject to the prohibition] to engage in speech not a development we should welcome.
No Facebook, no Instagram, no Twitter, no Pinterest, no Vine, no Tumblr** . ** And I wonder whether the VC itself, and/or washingtonpost.com, are within the statutory definition of “commercial social networking Web site.” We certainly “permit minor children to become members” and to “maintain personal Web pages” (via their Profile pages), the site is “operated by a person who derives revenue from . I’ve said it many times before — these sex offender cases are of the deepest importance, not because of any special concern we might have for convicted sex offenders but because they’re the despised minority subject to the harshest treatment that legislators and law enforcement officials can dream up; unless the courts stand up and make it clear that there are lines the government cannot cross without running afoul of the Constitution, government action will become more and more abusive, and then all of our rights are at risk.
A shame that the NC court didn’t view things that way. But, that doesn’t mean that speech is always protected.
As most VC readers know, First Amendment law is dominated by a single question, the 800-pound constitutional gorilla that’s always in the room: What “level of scrutiny” will the court apply to the challenged government action? a statute that regulates speech is subjected to exacting scrutiny: The State must show that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. But reasonable people can disagree, perhaps, about all that. [T]he statute here defines a “commercial social networking Web site” as one that facilitates social introduction between people, and provides users with a means of communicating with each other. This limitation on conduct only incidentally burdens the ability of registered sex offenders to engage in speech after accessing those Web sites Thus, accessing Facebook is conduct, not speech, and a prohibition on such access gets only the lowest form of scrutiny under the First Amendment. That is precisely like saying that a prohibition on using a telephone, or a printing press, is merely a regulation of “conduct” — because, I suppose, it constrains the physical acts of picking up and dialing a phone, or turning on a machine, with only an “incidental” burden on whatever happens those actions take place.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that North Carolina's law is constitutional "in all respects." Lower courts have struck down similar laws from Indiana and Louisiana.
Gil would travel from London to meet Karen for her birthday.
She was in and out of prison throughout the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, and upped her game each time she got out.
I’ve made my position clear many times (e.g., here and here): I think statutory schemes like this are ineffective, deeply unfair, counterproductive, cruel and unconstitutional on their face. [T]he essential purpose of section 14-202.5 is to limit conduct, specifically the ability of registered sex offenders to access certain carefully-defined Web sites.
In contrast, a regulation that governs conduct while imposing only an incidental burden upon speech must be evaluated in terms of [its] general effect . [internal quotations and citations omitted] The stated purpose of the law is to prevent sex offenders from “gathering information about minors on the Internet.” The statute defines a “commercial social networking Web site” within the statutory access prohibition as an Internet site that “(1) Is operated by a person who derives revenue from membership fees, advertising, or other sources related to the operation of the Web site; (2) Facilitates the social introduction between two or more persons for the purposes of friendship, meeting other persons, or information exchanges; (3) Allows users to create Web pages or personal profiles that contain information such as the name or nickname of the user, photographs placed on the personal Web page by the user, other personal information about the user, and links to other personal Web pages on the commercial social networking Web site of friends or associates of the user that may be accessed by other users or visitors to the Web site; [and] (4) Provides users or visitors to the commercial social networking Web site mechanisms to communicate with other users, such as a message board, chat room, electronic mail, or instant messenger.”“(1) Provides only one of the following discrete services: photo-sharing, electronic mail, instant messenger, or chat room or message board platform; or (2) Has as its primary purpose the facilitation of commercial transactions involving goods or services between its members or visitors.” Now, there are, I suppose, many things to be said for and against a statute like this.